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Abstract. Mobile NFC payment is an emerging industry, estimated to
reach $670 billion by 2015. The Mafia attack presents a realistic threat to
payment systems including mobile NFC payment. In this attack, a user
consciously initiates an NFC payment against a legitimate-looking NFC
reader (controlled by the Mafia), not knowing that the reader actually
relays the data to a remote legitimate NFC reader to pay for something
more expensive. In this paper, we present “Tap-Tap and Pay” (TTP), to
effectively prevent the Mafia attack in mobile NFC payment. In TTP, a
user initiates an NFC payment by physically tapping her mobile phone
against the reader twice in succession. The physical tapping causes tran-
sient vibrations at both devices, which can be measured by the embedded
accelerometers. Our experiments indicate that the two measurements are
closely correlated if they are from the same tapping, and are different
if obtained from different tapping events. By comparing the similarity
between the two measurements, we can effectively tell apart the Mafia
fraud from a legitimate NFC transaction. To evaluate the practical fea-
sibility of this solution, we present a prototype of the TTP system based
on a pair of NFC-enabled mobile phones and also conduct a user study.
The results suggest that our solution is reliable, fast, easy-to-use and has
good potential for practical deployment.
Keywords: Near Field Communication, Mobile NFC payment, Mafia
attack, MITM attack, Mobile sensor, Accelerometer, Security, Usability
1 Introduction
NFC payment: Near Field Communication (NFC) payment is an upcoming
technology that uses Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) to perform con-
tactless payments. An RFID system has two parts: the RFID tag (card) that
can be attached to any physical object to be identified; and the RFID reader
that can interrogate a tag within physical proximity, via radio frequency commu-
nication. An NFC-enabled payment card has an embedded RFID tag. To make
an NFC payment, the user just needs to hold the card in front of an NFC reader
for a short while and wait for confirmation. NFC payments are usually limited
to rather small-value purchases1.
1 For instance, the contactless limit increased from £20 to £30 in 2015 in the UK.
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Fig. 1. The Mafia attack: a malicious reader colludes with a malicious card and fools
the honest card to pay for something more expensive to a legitimate reader
A mobile phone can also be used as an NFC payment card. HSBC Hong
Kong Mobile Payment2, Google Wallet3, Apple Pay4, and Android Pay5 are
examples of NFC payment mobile apps. Using a mobile phone for NFC payment
is considered convenient since people can save all of their cards in their phones. It
is estimated that mobile payments using NFC will total 670 billion US dollars by
2015 [9]. To support this trend, new generations of smart phones have commonly
been equipped with NFC sensors. In this paper, we focus on mobile payment
using NFC. Hence unless stated otherwise, by “NFC card”, we refer to an NFC-
enabled mobile phone functioning as a payment card. By “NFC reader”, we refer
to a payment terminal that communicates with the card via NFC. A legitimate
NFC reader is one that is authorised by the banking network and is connected
to the back-end banking network for payment processing.
It is known that NFC payment is vulnerable to different types of Man-In-The-
Middle (MITM) attacks [21], also known in the literature as relay, or wormhole
attacks [19]. In a simple form of a relay attack known as ghost-and-leech attack
[22], the attacker places an NFC reader so as to secretly interrogate the user’s
NFC card without the user’s awareness, and relays the card response to a remote
NFC reader to obtain a payment from the victim’s account. Such an attack is
demonstrated in [20] and [21].
Relay attacks can be countered in a number of ways. A simple solution is
to put the NFC card within an NFC protective shield such as Id Stronghold6.
Equivalently, one can add an activation button so that the NFC function on
the phone is only turned on with an explicit user action. More advanced coun-
termeasures are proposed in the literature, including Secret Handshakes [18],
UWave [32], Still and Silent [37], and Tap-Wave-Rub [30]. However, none of
these solutions can prevent a more severe type of attack as we explain below.
Mafia attack: Another type of the MITM attack is called the Mafia attack,
which is also known as Mafia fraud [19] or the reader-and-ghost attack [38, 22].
In this more severe attack, the user consciously initiates an NFC payment with a
legitimate-looking reader controlled by the Mafia; but the reader actually relays
the card response to a remote legitimate NFC reader – via a malicious card – to
2 www.hsbc.com.hk
3 wallet.google.com
4 www.apple.com/iphone-6/apple-pay
5 www.android.com/intl/en us/pay
6 www.idstronghold.com
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pay for something more expensive. Figure 1 shows an example of such an attack.
This attack has been shown to be feasible in [19].
Unlike simple relay attacks, the Mafia attack cannot be prevented by using a
protective shield or an activation button since the user consciously initiates the
payment. For the same reason, various user-movement-based unlocking mecha-
nisms [18, 32, 37, 30] cannot stop the attack either. We will explain the current
countermeasures to this attack by first reviewing the NFC payment standards
and specifications.
NFC payment standards and specifications: EMV is the primary pro-
tocol standard for smart card payments in Europe. The EMV standards are man-
aged by EMVCo7, a consortium of multinational companies such as Visa, Master-
card, and American Express. These standards use smart-cards including contact
and contactless cards and are based on ISO/IEC 7816 [4] and ISO/IEC 14443.
Mobile NFC payment technologies, such as Android Host-based Card Emulation
(HCE)8, are also based on ISO/IEC 14443, which is an international standard
in four parts, defining the technology-specific requirements for proximity cards
used for identification [2, 3, 7, 8].
The extensive EMV specifications—presented in 10 books: A [10], B [11],
C1–C7 (e.g. [12, 13]), and D [14]—provide the details of EMV-compliant pay-
ment system design. Furthermore, EMVCo provides a book on security and key
management [1] as a part of EMV 4.3 specifications as well as additional security
guidelines for acquirers [5] and issuers [6] of EMV payment cards.
The risk of MITM attacks in payment systems has been generally neglected
in the above standards and specifications (except in a recent 2015 EMV Contact-
less payment specifications Book C-2 [12], as we will explain). As explained by
Drimer et al. in [19], such attacks are commonly perceived to be too expensive
to work. However, in the same paper, Drimer et al. show this is a misperception
by demonstrating practical MITM attacks in a set of live experiments against
the UK’s EMV system. Given the practicality of deploying such attacks [19] and
the projected rapid growth in the size of the contactless payment industry [9],
we believe that it is important for the payment industry to seriously consider
the security concerns posed by such attacks and the countermeasures that are
needed.
Distance bounding protocols: Distance bounding protocols have been
considered a potential solution to this problem. In the latest MasterCard EMV
specifications (Book C-2 [12] released in March 2015), a distance bounding pro-
tocol (called the Relay Resistance Protocol in the specifications) is defined. This
protocol starts with the reader sending the card a random challenge and the card
replying with a digitally signed response. The reader verifies the digital signa-
ture and also checks the response time is within a specified range. This protocol
requires an additional private key and a public key certificate installed on the
card. Furthermore, the card needs to perform expensive public key operations,
which may incur a notable processing delay. To minimize the processing delay on
7 www.emvco.com
8 developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/nfc/hce.html
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the card, most distance bounding protocols defined in the literature [16, 19] re-
sort to using only symmetric key operations, such as hash and symmetric-cipher
encryptions. However, applying those solutions to NFC payment would require
the card and the reader to have a pre-shared symmetric key. In the current
practice, the card only has a pre-shared key with the issuing bank. By contrast,
our solution does not require any additional cryptographic keys. In fact, it is
orthogonal to distance bounding protocols and can be used in conjuction with
any one of them.
Other countermeasures: Other countermeasures to the MITM attack have
been actively explored by a number of researchers. One straightforward solution
is to require user vigilance at the time of making the NFC payment. However,
it has been generally agreed that user vigilance alone is not sufficient [22, 33,
38]. It is desirable to design a countermeasure that can effectively prevent Mafia
attacks without having to rely on user vigilance. Current solutions generally in-
volve using ambient sensors to measure the characteristics of the surrounding
environment, such as light [22], sound [22], location via GPS [33] and a combina-
tion of temperature, humidity, precision gas, and altitude [38]. The underlying
assumption is that the malicious and legitimate readers will be in two differ-
ent locations with distinct ambient environments. However, the validity of this
assumption may be challenged in some situations where the two readers are in
similar environments (e.g., nearby stalls in the same mall).
Overview of our idea: Our idea is based on the following observation:
as a result of the physical tapping between a pair of devices (a card and a
reader quipped with accelerometers), the tapping creates transient vibrations,
which can be measured using embedded accelerometer sensors. By comparing
the similarity of the two measurements, we are able to determine if the two
devices were involved in the same tapping event. This effectively distinguishes
the Mafia attack from a normal NFC transaction.
In contrast to the mentioned solutions, we do not assume that the attacker’s
reader is in an environment different from that of the legitimate reader. Thus
our threat model considers a more severe attack.
Contributions: Our main contributions are summarised below:
1. We propose “Tap-Tap and Pay” (TTP) as a new countermeasure to prevent
Mafia attacks. Our solution is the first that works even if the malicious and
legitimate readers are in similar environments.
2. We present a proof-of-concept implementation of TTP by using a pair of
NFC-enabled smartphones. Experiments confirm that vibrations induced
from the same tapping event are closely correlated between the card and
the reader, while they are not if originating from different tapping events.
3. We conduct user studies to evaluate the usability of our TTP prototype.
Based on the feedback, users generally find the suggested solution fast and
easy to use.
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A) Physically tapping the B) Recording accelerometer
mobile to the reader measurements on both sides
acc card acc reader
C) Sending the accelerometer measurements to the bank via the reader
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acc reader
2. response card =
(challenge, acc card, . . .)key 4. result
Fig. 2. Overview of the proposed solution: Tap-Tap and Pay
2 Our Solution: Tap-Tap and Pay (TTP)
2.1 Threat model
We assume a user consciously initiates an NFC payment against a legitimate-
looking NFC reader without realizing that it is a malicious one controlled by the
Mafia. The difference between the malicious reader and the legitimate reader
is that the former is not connected to the back-end banking network while the
latter is. We assume the Mafia does not want to directly connect to the banking
network, as that will run the risk of being caught by the bank. The malicious
reader relays the victim’s card to a remote legitimate reader to pay for something
more expensive, through the help of an accomplice who holds a legitimate-looking
NFC card (see Figure 1). From the perspective of the legitimate merchant, there
is nothing suspicious – a customer uses a mobile phone to make an NFC payment.
The amount of the payment may be near the upper end of the limit, but that is
perfectly acceptable (see [19] for a demonstration of successful Mafia attacks on
the UK’s EMV payment system using contact chip-and-PIN cards; the attacks
on the contactless payment work in the same way).
Furthermore, we assume the attacker is able to put the NFC reader in an
ambient environment that is very similar to the legitimate reader. In one sce-
nario, the attacker may set up a mobile temporary stall near a shopping mall.
He may pretend to sell cheap items such as coffee, tea or confectionery, and show
the buyer a small amount on the reader’s screen. While accepting the buyer’s
NFC payment, the attacker relays it to one of his accomplices in nearby shops
to buy something more expensive. The attacker and his accomplices can avoid
detection by constantly changing the location. Once they make enough profit in
a day, they will disappear and repeat the same attack at a different place. Under
the above threat model, previous ambient-sensor-based solutions may fail com-
pletely. However, despite the assumption of a stronger attacker, we will present
a solution that can effectively prevent Mafia attacks under the same condition.
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The practical feasibility of such Mafia attacks [19], compounded by the fact
that they are undetectable by banks in the backend, can prove problematic.
This can have serious implications on the liability if the security of the system
only depends on user vigilance. In practice, if any dispute arises regarding the
discrepancy of the amount charged for an NFC payment, users will be to blame
by default since they are required to be “vigilant”. We believe this is not fair to
users. Our solution addresses this problem by providing banks more evidence so
they can tell apart a legitimate NFC payment from a Mafia fraud. This is done
at the minimum inconvenience to users, as we explain in the next section.
2.2 Overview of the solution
An overview of our solution is shown in Figure 2. First, the user physically taps
the mobile phone against the reader twice to make an NFC payment. The tapping
causes transient vibrations at both devices, which are measured by the embedded
accelerometer sensors. The user then holds the card close to the reader. At this
point, the reader detects the presence of an NFC card within physical proximity
and starts a standard challenge-and-response process for the NFC payment. At a
high level, this involves the reader sending a challenge to the card, and the card
replying with a response authenticated by a pre-shared key via MAC with the
issuing bank. Our solution does not alter this existing data flow; but within the
card response, we propose to add an additional item acc card to the items being
sent by the card. This new item represents the measurement of the vibration
by the card accelerometer. When the reader forwards the card’s response to
the issuing bank through a secure back-end network, it appends acc reader ,
which is the measurement of the vibration by the reader accelerometer. The
bank compares the two measurements and approves the transaction only if it
finds the two sufficiently similar. Recall that in Figure 1, the user’s NFC card
and the legitimate NFC reader are honest devices and can perform trustworthy
measurements.
TTP suggests two taps because we found it to be the minimum number
of taps needed to obtain both sufficiently correlated measurements of the same
tapping, and at the same time sufficiently uncorrelated measurements of different
tappings. Of course with more than two taps, more features can be extracted,
but at the expense of user convenience. Hence, we chose double-tap as the default
setting for our solution.
2.3 Sensor data preprocessing
To enable data collection, we developed two Android apps: Card app and Reader
app and installed them on two NFC-enabled smartphones, two Nexus 5 devices9,
which are equipped with a range of different sensors.
9 Prototyping of our TTP protocol requires the facility of bidirectional NFC using
Host-based Card Emulation (HCE). At the time of experiments, Nexus 5 was the
only device allowing that facility.
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Fig. 3. Final sequences obtained from Equation 1 (top), and their derivatives from
Equation 2 (bottom) of a sample of double tapping
Accelerometer data: We use the embedded accelerometer sensor on the mo-
bile phone to capture vibration changes during physical tapping. The accelerom-
eter sensor returns acceleration data in three dimensions, obtained by measuring
forces (including the force of gravity) applied to the sensor along the local x, y
and z axes. The coordinate system is defined with reference to the phone screen
in its portrait orientation; x is horizontal in the plane of the screen from left of
the screen towards right, y vertical from the bottom of the screen towards up,
and z perpendicular to the plane of the screen from inside the screen towards out-
side. We consider the sequence representing the length of the three-dimensional
vector obtained through accelerometer measurements calculated from Equation
1 where the components represent the i-th measurement in the three dimensions
(accxi, accyi, acczi):
acci =
√
acc2xi + acc
2
yi + acc
2
zi (1)
Fig. 3 (top) shows the above vector length sequences acci for a typical double-
tapping as measured on a card and a reader. From now on, we refer to this vector
length sequence acci simply as accelerometer measurement.
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Derivatives: As shown in Fig. 3 (top), the accelerometer measurement made by
the card is more vibrant than that by the reader, since the card is moving in the
hand of the user. They are also different in scale, depending on the start status
of accelerometers. In order to smooth out irrelevant movements specially on the
card side, we apply the following equation (based on [26]) to approximate the
first derivatives of the sequences. The results are displayed in Fig. 3 (bottom).
Di =
(acci − acci−1) + ((acci+1 − acci−1)/2)
2
(2)
Sequence alignment: After obtaining the derivatives, we align the two se-
quences by identifying the peaks. This can be simply achieved by searching for
the extreme values (max or min) with a minimum gap between them. The two
sequences are then aligned based on the first peak (with a few linear shifts to get
the best matching by trial-and-error). Based on our evaluation of the collected
data, we found that this simple alignment algorithm is accurate and fast.
After the alignment of the two sequences, we cut a segment of each sequence,
starting from 0.2 seconds before the first peak until 0.2 seconds after the second
peak. This covers the whole significant variation of the accelerometer data. Our
analysis shows that with this setting, the whole recording time is in the range
of 0.6 and 1.5 seconds.
2.4 Similarity comparison
Suggested sensor data comparison methods include correlation coefficients, co-
variance, cross covariance (e.g. [15]) and cross correlation (e.g. [18] and [22]) in
the time domain, and coherence (e.g.[36]) in the frequency domain. We found the
correlation coefficients in the time domain and the coherence in the frequency
domain to be the two most effective ones on our collected data. Here we use
them along with the energy of the series as well as the distance between the two
peaks as the inputs of our suggest TTP decision maker.
Correlation coefficient (Time domain). The correlation coefficient is com-
monly used to compare the similarity of the shapes of two signals. The intuition
is that if the two measurements originate from the same double-tap, their signal
shapes, especially their tap shapes, would be highly correlated, and otherwise
they would not be correlated. Given two sequences X and Y and Cov(X,Y )
denoting covariance between X and Y, the correlation coefficient is computed as
below, where Cov(X,X) = σ2X and Cov(Y, Y ) = σ
2
Y :
RXY =
Cov(X,Y )√
Cov(X,X) · Cov(Y, Y ) (3)
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Coherence (Frequency domain): To obtain a similarity measure in the fre-
quency domain, we apply the coherence method which indicates the level of
matching of features in the frequency domain between two time series. Given
two sequences X and Y , we compute the magnitude squared coherence based on
the following equation, where PXX(f) and PY Y (f) are power spectral densities
of X and Y , and PXY (f) the cross power spectral density between X and Y :
CXY (f) =
|PXY (f)|2
PXX(f) · PY Y (f) (4)
We define the similarity rate between the two signals based on magnitude squared
coherence as the sum of the squares of the magnitudes of coherence values at all
frequencies as follows:
FXY =
∑
f
CXY (f) (5)
Energy Difference: Our analysis shows that different users tap devices with
different strengths; some taps are very gentle, some are of medium strength, and
some are very strong. We found that the total energy levels of the card and reader
sequences of the same tap are strongly correlated, while they are distinctive if
obtained from different taps. Hence, we use the following measure to capture the
distance of two signals X and Y in term of the total signal energy levels:
DXY =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
t
X(t)2 −
∑
t
Y (t)2
∣∣∣∣∣ (6)
Peak Gap Difference: Last but not least, the distance between the two peaks
in each measured sequence is an important factor in deciding if two measure-
ments come from the same double tapping or not. We define GXY in Equation 7
where GapX is the distance between the two extremums of sequence X and
GapY is the distance defined similarly for sequence Y :
GXY = |GapX −GapY | (7)
TTP Decision Engine: Our TTP decision engine has two steps. First, we
have an initial check according to the peak gap defined in Equation 7 and then
we use a combined method to include the other three similarity measures. We
suggest a simple linear fusion method by using the weighted sum of the three
measures: correlation coefficient, coherence, and the energy similarity. There-
fore, the ultimate decision is made based on comparing the peak gap against a
threshold and if successful comparing the weighted sum of the combined method
against another threshold. Hence according to the output of the decision engine,
the bank decides to authorize or decline the transaction.
We use a simple linear normalisation that maps the three values to the in-
terval [0, 1]. Let us denote these normalised versions by R¯XY , F¯XY , and D¯XY ,
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Fig. 4. Data collection environment (left), Card app (centre), and Reader app (right)
respectively. Since unlike the other two measures, D¯XY decreases with similarity,
we define E¯XY as below. Note that E¯XY is also a normalised value belonging to
the interval [0, 1].
E¯XY = 1− D¯XY (8)
Given R¯XY , F¯XY and E¯XY , TXY calculates the total similarity rate of two
signals X and Y as below, where a, b and c are the weights of each method:
TXY = a · R¯XY + b · F¯XY + c · E¯XY (9)
The weight parameters are determined through experiments based on the col-
lected user data by testing all possible weights up to two decimal places for a, b,
and c – under the condition that the sum of them is equal to 1 – and observing
the equal error rate. The values which gave us the best error rate have been fixed
as a = 0.45, b = 0.21, and c = 0.33.
3 System evaluation
3.1 Experiment setup and Data collection
We implemented a proof-of-concept prototype for the TTP system by develop-
ing two Android apps (card and reader). When the user taps the reader, the
two apps independently record the accelerometer data. Once the NFC card is
detected by the reader in close proximity, the two devices start a two way NFC
communication and simulate an NFC payment.
In order to evaluate the system performance based on real user data, we
recruited 23 volunteers (university students and staff, 10 males and 13 females)
to participate in the data collection, each performing five double tapping actions.
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Method Equal error rate
Correlation coefficients 19.15%
Coherence 27.91%
Total energy 23.48%
Peak gap 14.09%
TTP decision algorithm 9.99%
Table 1. Equal error rates for different suggested methods
We made a short self-explanatory training video to demonstrate how to do the
double-tap and showed it to the users before the experiment. Users generally
found the video guide useful in helping them quickly grasp the instruction of
“Tap-Tap and Pay”.
We fixed the reader phone to the table using double-sided tape, as shown
in Fig. 4 (left). The front of the phone faced downwards and the back was
labelled “Reader”. We used MyMobiler10 to operate the reader through a USB
connection. The GUIs of the reader and card apps are shown in Fig. 4 , right and
centre, respectively. After launching the card app, the user just double tapped
the phone to the reader and kept it close to complete an NFC payment. Once
she was notified of a successful completion, she could repeat the experiment. The
recorded sensor data were saved into a file for further analysis in Matlab.
3.2 Results
We use the False Negative Rate (FNR) and the False Positive Rate (FPR) to
evaluate the performance. The FNR is the rate that two measurements from the
same tap event are determined as not matching. The FPR is the rate that two
measurements from two different tap events are determined as matching. FNR
and FPR vary according to a threshold. The Equal Error Rate (EER) is the rate
where the FNR and the FPR curves intersect. The EER is commonly used as a
measure to evaluate the overall performance of a system. We computed the EERs
based on the similarity comparison methods as described in Section 2.4. The
results for EER are presented in Table 1. Overall, the Equal Error Rate of our
prototype system is 9.99% using the combined method (Table 1). Therefore with
this setting, we have FNR= FPR= 9.99%. Hence, a legitimate NFC transaction
may be falsely rejected with a probability of 9.99%. Then the user would need
to try again. On average, it takes 1/(1− 0.099) = 1.1 attempts for a legitimate
user to complete an NFC payment transaction. On the other hand, if the Mafia
attack takes place during the NFC payment, the transaction is more likely to be
denied by the bank due to inconsistent data measurements. The Mafia may trick
the user to try again, but it would require on average 1/0.099 = 10 attempts
to get a fraudulent transaction to come through. However, consecutively failed
verifications for a single NFC transaction will likely trigger an alert at the back-
end banking network, prompting an investigation. Furthermore, when the user
10 www.mymobiler.com
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gets repeated denials from the NFC payment (say three times), she might not
try further and may choose to query her bank instead. All this can significantly
increase the chance of having the Mafia attack exposed.
3.3 Online and offline modes
So far, the description of our TTP solution assumes that the NFC transaction is
online i.e., the reader is connected to the banking network, so that the backend
system is able to evaluate the received measurements and authorize the payment
in real-time. The same assumption is made in other researchers’ solutions [22,
33, 38] (which we will detail in Section 5).
However in practice, an NFC transaction may be performed offline. Accord-
ing to the EMV specifications, an EMV transaction flow includes several steps
including offline data authentication and online transaction authorisation. De-
pending on the result of the negotiation between the card and the reader, the
card may decide to go with offline authorisation. This decision is based on dif-
ferent factors including the transaction value, the type, and the card’s record of
recent offline transactions. Our solution will be less effective in the offline mode,
however, we believe it still provides important added value in preserving criti-
cal evidence when a dispute regarding Mafia attacks occurs and a retrospective
fraud investigation is needed.
4 Usability study
4.1 Experiment setup and Data collection
We performed a second experiment to evaluate usability aspects of the system.
We asked 22 different users (partially overlapped the previous user set, university
students and staff, 15 males and 7 females) to perform two NFC payments; first
by using the contactless method, and second by using TTP. We developed two
Android apps (card and reader) to simulate the two tasks. Before the experiment,
we presented users a study description, including a short introduction of mobile
contactless payment using NFC, followed by a general description of mobile
payment using TTP. In the first task, the user was asked to hold the phone near
the reader and wait for the confirmation message. In the second task, the user
was asked to double-tap the reader, keep the phone near the reader and wait for
the confirmation. Figure 5 shows the GUIs of the two tasks in this experiment.
4.2 Findings
After completing the two tasks, the users were asked to fill in a questionnaire and
rate the level of convenience, speed, and feeling of the security of each payment
method in a Likert scale from level 5 to 1 (corresponding to “strongly agree”,
“agree”, “neutral”, “disagree”, and “strongly disagree”). They were also asked
to write free comments about their experience in this experiment. Figure 6 shows
the average user rating of using the contactless payment and the TTP method.
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Fig. 5. User study Card app; Task 1: Contactless payment (left), Task 2: TTP (right)
As shown in Fig. 6, users generally found contactless payment more conve-
nient than TTP. Including a physical action makes it less convenient for some
users. As one user commented: “... the fact that I need to keep the device close
to the reader after tapping made the experience less convenient”.
However, in contrast to convenience, many users considered TTP faster than
the contactless method, since they were able to precisely sense the start of the
action by tapping, while it took them some time to find the proper distance
in contactless payment. The uncertainty about when contactless payment would
start made some people feel that the process took longer than how long it actually
took. As one user commented: “Even [though] I had to tap twice, but the process
felt faster comparing to the first one. I feel after tapping I automatically bring
the phone close enough to the reader, but in first task, my phone was not close
for a while and it took longer”.
Moreover, users felt TTP is more secure than contactless payment. By per-
forming a physical tapping action, users felt in control of the transaction and
would worry less about accidental payments. As one of the users commented:
“As before [i.e. task 1] payment is very easy. I like the action of tapping the
reader as this made me feel more in control of when the transaction took place.
I felt this method [TTP] was more secure due to the action of tapping to start
the transaction. This meant I know when the transaction took place”. A similar
view was expressed by another user in the comment: “The payment [in task 1]
is very easy, but I don’t know when the connection between wallet and reader is
made; range or time, so I would keep my payment device away from the reader
to be sure until I want to pay.”
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Fig. 6. User study: average user rating of contactless payment and TTP
5 Comparison with previous works
Table 2 briefly compares TTP with previous ambience sensing based solutions.
In terms of security, TTP is the first solution able to prevent the Mafia attack
even when both readers share the same ambient environment. Ambience sensing
solutions are inherently incapable of detecting the attack in this condition.
We now review the error rates reported in the previous works based on mea-
suring the ambient environment. Halevi et al. [22] (sensors: audio and light)
report false positive and false negative rates of 0% for audio sensor, and around
5% for light sensor for distinguishing different business types (such as library,
concert hall, restaurant, etc.). Ma et al. [33] (sensor: GPS) report a 0% false neg-
ative rate under the assumption that the attacker is located 20 meters or farther,
67.5% when the distance is more that 5 meters, and 100% when the distance is
less than one meter. False positive rates are not reported in their work. Shrestha
et al. [38] (sensors: multiple sensors) report false negative rates approximately
in the range of 10%–25% and false positive rates approximately in the range of
15%–30% for individual sensors. By combining the sensor readings, they achieve
a false negative rate of about 3% and a false positive rate of about 6%.
The equal error rate of 9.99% in our result is comparable to those reported
in the previous works. However, when the two readers are in nearby locations
and share the same or similar ambient environments, the reported error rates
in [22] [33] [38] are no longer meaningful and all previous ambient-sensor based
solutions may fail completely. By contrast, our TTP solution works regardless
of whether or not the two readers share similar ambient environments.
In terms of usability, our protocol needs a sensor recording of only 0.6 to
1.5 seconds which is sufficiently fast for contactless payment. Schemes based
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Prevents Recording Embedded Based on
Sensor/ Solution attacker at same duration mobile ambience
environment (sec) sensors or device
Audio [22] 7 1 3 Ambience
Light [22] 7 2 3 Ambience
GPS [33] 7 10 3 Ambience
Temperature (T) [38] 7 instant 7 Ambience
Precision Gas (G) [38] 7 instant 7 Ambience
Humidity (H) [38] 7 instant 7 Ambience
Altitude (A) [38] 7 instant 7 Ambience
THGA [38] 7 instant 7 Ambience
Accelerometer (TTP) 3 0.6–1.5 3 Device
Table 2. Comparing TTP with ambient sensors based solutions
on audio and light sensors [22] achieve similar timings. However, the GPS-based
protocol [33] requires 10 seconds of sensor recording which makes the system not
suitable for contactless payment. Our scheme is based on accelerometer which
is readily available on most mobile devices, as are microphones (audio), light
sensors, and GPS. However, meteorological sensors [38] are only available on
specialised devices which is a barrier in adopting such protocols in practice.
In summary, our solution presents a new approach in tackling the Mafia
attack with promising initial results in terms of security, efficiency and usability.
Being orthogonal ways to solve the same problem, TTP and ambient-sensor-
based solutions could potentially be combined to achieve even better results. We
leave this as a subject for further investigation in future.
6 Further related works
In this section, we present some other related works that either use Tap gesture,
or accelerometer sensor data for other security purposes, and explain how TTP
differs from them.
Bump. Using the tap gesture to establish device to device communication
has been suggested before. Bump11 is probably the most well-known example in
this category. Two users bumps their mobile phones together to exchange con-
tacts, photos and files. Each phone sends a set of data to a remote server, includ-
ing the device’s location (via GPS), the IP address, the timestamp of bumping
and the accelerometer measurement. The server matches the devices based on
the received data and transfers the data between the two matched devices. Bump
and TTP are clearly distinct as they solve different problems and they assume
different threat models. Our threat model assumes a malicious reader, whereas in
the Bump model, the two devices bumped to each other are assumed to be both
legitimate. Consequently, our main goal is to protect against MITM adversaries
whereas Bump’s main goal is to identify devices being bumped together. In fact,
11 www.bu.mp
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it has been shown that Bump is vulnerable to MITM attacks [39] due to timing
issues. It is worth mentioning that privacy concerns that arise from environment
sensing also apply to Bump since at least the locations and IP addresses of all
users in the system are communicated with the Bump server each time the app
is used. Since January 2014, Bump has been discontinued with all apps removed
from App Store and Google Play [31].
Tap identification proposals. Performing a tap gesture in order to syn-
chronise multiple devices has been proposed in Synchronous Gestures [24]. Tap
identification using mobile accelerometer is another problem which could also be
applied for security purposes. For example Tap-Wave-Rub [30] suggests a sys-
tem for malware prevention for smarphones. Although similar sensors are used
in these proposals, they are in general orthogonal to our solution since they are
designed to solve an identification problem for legitimate devices, whereas our
solution is designed to resist Mafia attacks in an environment where one of the
devices behaves maliciously. Consequently, these solutions can be used alongside
our proposal to provide a system in which tapping is used to both unlock the
device and secure the payment.
Shake to pair. The idea of shaking two devices for device pairing has been
suggested by multiple works [35, 36, 34, 15, 27, 28]. While both TTP and the men-
tioned works use accelerometer, the amount of entropy produced by shaking, the
eventual application, the threat model, and the problem solved by these works
are all different from ours. In these works, the user needs to shake the two de-
vices together for a while until both devices generate and agree on a shared
key, whereas in our work we do not aim to generate shared keys and we only
need the user to tap her device to the reader twice. Device pairing, and more
generally key exchange cannot prevent Mafia attacks due to the involvement of
the malicious reader. Device pairing and securing NFC payments are distinct
security problems. While the former has been explored by researchers for a long
time [17, 25, 29], the latter is less explored. However, with the impending global
deployment of NFC payments, we believe the security of NFC payments deserves
more attention by the security community.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a simple and effective solution, called “Tap-Tap
and Pay” (TTP), to prevent the Mafia attack in NFC payment by sing mobile
sensors. Our solution leverages the characteristics of vibration when an NFC
card is physically tapped on an NFC reader. We observed that the accelerometer
measurements produced by both devices were closely correlated within the same
tapping, while they were different if obtained from different tapping events. The
experimental results and the user feedback suggest the practical feasibility of the
proposed solution. As compared with previous ambient-sensor based solutions,
ours has the advantage that it works even when the attacker’s reader and the
legitimate reader are in nearby locations or share similar ambient environments.
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The TTP solution can be easily integrated into existing EMV standards and
requires minimal infrastructural change to the EMV system. The structure of
the payment protocol remains the same; only an extra string of accelerome-
ter measurement is added in the transmitted message. In terms of hardware,
deploying TTP requires the integration of accelerometer sensors in contactless
readers. This can be done progressively by equipping the next generation of the
readers with accelerometer sensors which are quite inexpensive (e.g., iPhone 4
accelerometers are estimated to cost 65 cents each [23]). Furthermore, TTP can
be rolled out gradually since the protocols remain backward compatible.
In future work, we plan to investigate how to further improve system perfor-
mance by e.g., combining different sensor measurements and using more precise
sensors on newer mobile phones. Moreover, it will also be interesting to explore
if it is feasible to apply TTP to other NFC-based payment solutions such as
NFC-enabled credit/debit cards, and Barclays bPay band12 to defend against
the Mafia attack by retrofitting accelerometers to such devices.
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